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Abstrakt
Tato pra´ce se zaob´ıra´ pouzˇit´ım metody fuzzingu na testova´n´ı aplikac´ı komunikuj´ıc´ıch prˇes
syste´m D-Bus. Prvn´ı cˇa´st je zameˇrˇena´ na sezna´men´ı s pojmem fuzzing a na vyuzˇit´ı te´to
metody prˇi testova´n´ı aplikac´ı. Na´sleduje popis syste´mu D-Bus a jeho architektury. V druhe´
cˇa´sti se pra´ce zaob´ıra´ vhodny´m zp˚usobem, jaky´m by se daly pomoc´ı metody fuzzingu
testovat aplikace komunikuj´ıc´ı prˇes syste´m D-Bus. V ra´mci pra´ce byl implementovany´
na´stroj na testova´n´ı aplikac´ı, ktere´ vyuzˇ´ıvaj´ı tento syste´m na meziprocesovou komunikaci.
Prˇi implementaci tohoto na´stroje byl kladen d˚uraz na to, aby s n´ım bylo mozˇne´ otesto-
vat co nejveˇtsˇ´ı spektrum aplikac´ı. Testova´n´ı probeˇhlo na trˇech vybrany´ch aplikac´ıch –
GNOME Shell, IMSettings a Evince. Ve dvou ze trˇ´ı zmı´neˇny´ch aplikac´ıch (GNOME Shell,
IMSettings) byly nalezeny chyby, ktere´ zp˚usobily jejich pa´d. Implementovany´ na´stroj takte´zˇ
detekoval u´niky pameˇti v aplikaci IMSettings.
Abstract
This thesis discusses use of the fuzzing for testing applications communicating through D-
Bus system. The first part is focused on introducing the concept of the fuzzing and on use
of this method when testing applications. Subsequently, there is a description of D-Bus
system and its architecture. In the second part, the thesis deals with an appropriate
way of using the fuzzing method for testing applications communicating through D-Bus
system. A tool was implemented within this thesis for testing applications which use
this system for interprocess communication. During implementation of the tool there was
an effort to make it possible to test the greatest variety of applications. Testing took place
on the three selected applications – GNOME Shell, IMSettings and Evince. In the two
of these three applications (GNOME Shell, IMSettings) was found bugs which caused their
crash. Implemented tool also detected memory leaks in IMSettings application.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Testing is used to find bugs (errors or other defects) in software. By finding bugs, testing
also provides quality assurance of software. Software testing can be stated as the process
of validating and verifying that a computer software:
• meets the design and development requirements,
• works as expected,
• is secure,
• and that bugs are not present.
Fuzzing is a type of testing where a goal is to find bugs in software, preferably ones that
have security implications. Fuzzing is automated, brute force technique of testing and it ex-
ploits the fact that many bugs in software are caused by handling inputs from a user without
applying validation routines on that inputs. The goal of fuzz testing (fuzzing) is to crash
an application or a protocol and analyze the results. Fuzzing is presented in the next chap-
ter.
The goal of this work is to test applications using D-Bus communication system and to im-
plement a tool for automation of this task. The targets of testing done in this work are
applications connected to a session bus daemon and using it for routing messages.
In the third chapter the D-Bus message bus system is described. The chapter includes
description of protocols in general, D-Bus architecture, message bus daemons, addressing
on D-Bus, calling methods and emitting signals. Also the GDBus D-Bus binding is de-
scribed which was used in an implementation of the fuzzing tool.
The fourth chapter is devoted to description of designing a tool for fuzzing applications
using D-Bus communication system. The chapter discusses methods which can be used
for testing D-Bus system and its applications. Subsequently, the architecture of the tool
for fuzzing and its implementation are described.
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Results of the fuzz testing performed with the implemented tool are discussed in the fifth
chapter. The chapter includes tables where methods and results of their calls are stated
for every tested application. Also the run times of the tests are stated and for the tests
where memory leaks were detected, the tables also contains a normal process memory usage
against an abnormal one.
The conclusion summarizes what was the purpose of this work, how a fuzzing was used
to test applications using D-Bus communication system, evaluation of results and achieve-
ments and suggestions for improvements.
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Chapter 2
Fuzzing
The term fuzzing was first used by professor Barton Miller who used fuzzing to test ro-
bustness of UNIX applications in 1989 [2]. Fuzzing is defined in “Fuzzing: Brute Force
Vulnerability Discovery” [6, p. 22] as “a method for discovering faults in software by pro-
viding unexpected input and monitoring for exceptions. It is typically an automated or
semiautomated process that involves repeatedly manipulating and supplying data to target
software for processing”. Another definition (from “Fuzzing for Software Security Testing
and Quality Assurance” [2, p. 1]) says it is “a highly automated testing technique that cov-
ers numerous boundary cases using invalid data (from files, network protocols, API calls,
and other targets) as application input to better ensure the absence of exploitable vulnera-
bilities. The name comes from modem applications tendency to fail due to random input
caused by line noise on ‘fuzzy’ telephone lines”. Some other terms used to describe tests
similar to fuzzing include [2, p. 24]:
• Negative testing
• Protocol mutation
• Robustness testing
• Syntax testing
• Fault injection
• Rainy-day testing
• Dirty testing
The aim of fuzzing is to crash a program or a protocol and analyze the crash results.
This is why many vendors want a crash data. It is very important because a crash tells so
much about a program. Fuzzing is close to the boundary value analysis, where you create
test values that infringe the boundary of known good and bad values. Fuzzing is very ef-
fective because many exploitable vulnerabilities are caused by applications accepting user
input and processing that data without applying validation routines [6].
The division of fuzzers to categories and subcategories as also information gathered
in this chapter are from books “Fuzzing: Brute Force Vulnerability Discovery” [6] and “Fuzzing
for Software Security Testing and Quality Assurance” [2].
5
2.1 Fuzzing as software testing technique
Testing in general uses two different approaches. The “white box” testing is used to test
internal structures of an application as testers have access to a source code of an applica-
tion and so are able to test many conditions and paths through the code base and uncover
potential errors. In the “black box” approach testers do not have a knowledge of an appli-
cation internals. Testers are aware of what the application is supposed to do but are not
aware of how it does it. Rather than internals the functionality of an application is tested
and the same applies for fuzzing as it is essentially the functional testing technique focused
on the software security. The functional testing can be viewed as “black box” with one or
more external interfaces available for injecting test cases, but without any other information
available on the internals of the tested system.
One of a fuzzing main goals is to crash a system. It is a testing approach that would
almost never occure in a normal environment (the negative testing) and it is used to test
software robustness. As stated in “Fuzzing for Software Security Testing and Quality Assur-
ance” [2, p. 18] robustness of software is “an ability to tolerate exceptional inputs and stress-
ful environmental conditions. Software is not robust if it fails when facing such circum-
stances. Attackers can take advantage of robustness problems and compromise the system
running the software. Most security vulnerabilities reported in the public are caused by ro-
bustness weaknesses”.
Programs and frameworks that are used to create fuzz tests or perform fuzz testing are
commonly called fuzzers. Fuzzers fit the best for finding errors that can cause a program
to crash, such as buffer overflows, denial of service attacks, format bugs and SQL injections.
Fuzz testing is less effective for finding a security threats that do not cause program crashes,
such as spyware, some viruses, worms, trojans and keyloggers.
Fuzz testing is simple and can often reveal defects that are overlooked when software
is designed, written and debugged. Fuzz testing is usually used to find the faults that
a normal testing is not able to detect. As any other type of a testing, fuzz testing also
cannot guarantee a complete security, quality and effectiveness of software.
2.2 Fuzzer categories
Fuzzers can be divided into two groups:
• Mutation-based fuzzers apply mutations on existing data samples to create test
cases. This means that existing chunk of data is taken by a fuzzer and fields which
are defined as modifiable by specification within this chunk are modified each time
before sending that data to the tested software. Modifications can be random or
driven by some protocol specifications.
• Generation-based fuzzers create test cases from scratch by modeling the target
protocol of a certain format. Creating test cases includes use of mechanisms to gener-
ate valid data for a protocol or a valid computer program for a compiler fuzz testing.
Mechanisms to generate such valid data can include finite state machines, formal
grammars or formal languages.
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2.3 Fuzzer subcategories
Generally we can divide fuzzers into these subcategories:
• pregenerated test cases
• random test cases
• manual protocol mutation testing
• mutation or brute force testing
• automatic protocol generation testing
2.3.1 Pregenerated test cases
This method was used in PROTOS framework [7]. The method includes studying a par-
ticular specification to understand all supported data structures and the acceptable value
ranges. Packets or files are then generated to test boundary conditions or violate the spec-
ification. A disadvantage is that there is no random component, once the list of test cases
is exhausted, fuzzing is complete.
2.3.2 Random test cases
This method simply generate pseudo-random data and uses it as the target input, waiting
for the result. Example of this can be:
while [1]; do cat /dev/urandom | nc -vv localhost 22; done
This command reads random data from Linux urandom device and then transmits that data
to localhost address on port 22 (ssh). The biggest disadvantage of this simple technique is
tracking back how some random bytes caused an application crash. This includes capturing
the input we sent to application and also debugging a corrupted stack.
2.3.3 Manual protocol mutation testing
In manual protocol mutation testing there is no automated fuzzer involved. The researcher
is the fuzzer, simply entering inappropriate data in an attempt to crash an application or
to find some undesirable behaviour. The success depends on the researcher knowledge and
experience. This class of fuzzing is most often applied to web applications.
2.3.4 Mutation or brute force testing
A brute force in this class of fuzzing is referring to a fuzzer that starts with a valid sam-
ple of a protocol or data and continually mangles some amount of bytes within that data
packet or file. It requires only a little research and an implementation of a brute force fuzzer
is relatively straightforward. The main advantage is that the process is fully automated.
Disadvantages are that it takes many samples of data to get decent coverage of protocol
specifications or file definitions, so many CPU cycles will be wasted on data that cannot
be interpreted. Examples of brute force file format fuzzers include FileFuzz [16] and not-
SPIKEfile [17].
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2.3.5 Automatic protocol generation testing
Automatic protocol generation testing is a more advanced method of brute force testing.
In this approach, research is needed to first understand a protocol specification and a file
definition. Then the grammar is created that describes how the protocol specification works.
It includes identifying portions of data that are to remain static and others that represents
fuzzable variables. The fuzzer then generates fuzz data for that variables and sends the re-
sulting packet to the target. The success depends on the researcher’s ability to pinpoint
those portions of the specification that are most likely to lead to faults in the target applica-
tion. Examples of this type of fuzzers are SPIKE [1] and SPIKEfile [17]. Both of these tools
take SPIKE script descriptions of their target protocol or file format and use a fuzzing en-
gine of SPIKE framework to create mangled data. SPIKE is actually a fuzzer creation kit,
providing an API that allows users to create their own fuzzers for network based protocols
using the C programming language. SPIKE defines a number of primitives that it makes
available to C coders which allows SPIKE to construct fuzzed messages called “SPIKES”
that can be sent to a network service to hopefully induce errors.
2.4 Fuzzer types
Each type of target has its own class of fuzzer as different target software needs different
approaches to fuzzing. The fuzzer types in this section are covering only basic types. There
can be more different and more specific fuzzer types. Subsections in this section will describe
each type of fuzzer as divided in “Fuzzing: Brute Force Vulnerability Discovery” [6].
2.4.1 Local fuzzers
Local fuzzers are used for fuzzing applications running on the same computer and operating
system as local fuzzers do. They usually serve to fuzz test command line arguments, envi-
ronment variables, and any other locally available interfaces. Interesting targets for local
fuzzers are UNIX setuid applications which allow a normal user to temporarily gain elevated
privileges. Any vulnerability in this type of applications will give a user escalated privileges
and ability to execute arbitary code. Example of such an application can be the passwd
program:
ls -l --full-time /usr/bin/passwd
-rwsr-xr-x. 1 root root 27848 2012-12-04 18:27:43 +0100 /usr/bin/passwd
which has the setuid flag set, to allow a user to change a password1. Setuid means Set
User ID upon execution. If the setuid flag is set on a file, a user executing that file gets
the permissions of the individual user or group that owns the file. You can set the setuid
flag of a file in Linux by:
sudo chown root:root file
sudo chmod u+s file
This will give a user root privileges when executing the file. There are two distinct targets
for fuzzing setuid applications – applications accepting command-line arguments and ap-
plications using environment variables.
1in “-rwsr-xr-x” privileges string, the “s” letter means a file has the setuid flag set
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Command-line argument fuzzers
Applications usually process command-line arguments as strings. The following example
demonstrates command-line argument stack overflow:
#include <string.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
char buffer[5];
strcpy(buffer, argv[1]);
}
If it would have setuid bit set, it could be misused to get elevated privileges. The easiest
way to find such errors (even without source code available) is fuzzing. Useful tools for
command-line fuzzing can be clfuzz [5] and iFUZZ [17] which can be used for format string
and buffer overflow testing.
Environment variable fuzzers
Another local fuzzer type is a fuzzer testing environment variables. Example of an error
where value from the environment variable HOME is used unsafely:
#include <string.h>
int main(void) {
char buffer[5];
strcpy(buffer, getenv("HOME"));
}
This is the similar error as for command-line arguments – the buffer overflow. Tools for
fuzzing this type of bugs are Sharefuzz [1] and iFUZZ [17].
2.4.2 File format fuzzers
Many applications are working with file input and output. All applications which use
configuration files need to parse them. These applications must properly handle file parsing
even if files are malformed (maliciously or by some random damage). The file format
fuzzers are used to test these applications which must properly handle file input. A file
format fuzzer will dynamically create different malformed files that are then parsed using
the target application. The examples of useful tools for file fuzzing are notSPIKEfile [17]
and SPIKEfile [17].
2.4.3 Remote fuzzers
Remote fuzzers are used for testing software that listens on a network interface. As most
attacks are done remotely and can provide an attacker with access to sensitive data, target-
ing these applications for testing is important. Targets for this type of fuzz testing include
network protocols, web applications and web browsers.
Network protocol fuzzers
Network protocol fuzzers can be divided into two categories based on protocol complex-
ity. Simple protocols often have simple authentication or no authentication at all. They
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are usually based on ASCII text and do not contain checksum or length fields. Complex
protocols, on the other hand are comprised of binary data and they might use encryp-
tion for authentication. Useful tools for network protocol fuzzing are SPIKE [1] or Peach
fuzzer [3].
Web application fuzzers
As web applications became popular they are used to access back-end services as e-mail,
internet banking, and many more. Even traditional desktop applications as word processing
are available on the Web. Web application fuzzers must be capable of communicating via
HTTP protocol and they are looking for vulnerabilities unique to specific Web applications.
Example of web application fuzzer is WebScarab [8] which behaves as a proxy intercepting
web browser web requests and web server replies.
2.4.4 In-memory fuzzers
In-memory fuzzers can be implemented by freezing and taking a snapshot of a process
and rapidly injecting faulty data into one of its input routines. After each test case,
the snapshot taken previously is restored and new data is injected. This is repeated until
all of the test cases are exhausted.
2.4.5 Fuzzer frameworks
A fuzzing framework is a generic fuzzer or fuzzer library that simplifies data representation
for many types of targets. Fuzzing framework usually includes a library to produce fuzz
strings or values that produce problems in parsing routines. It should also include a script-
like language for creating a specific fuzzer. The most important property of generic fuzzers
is reusability. The main disadvantages are development time of a framework, its complex-
ity and sometimes limitations (target of fuzzing is not suitable for framework). Fuzzing
frameworks include SPIKE [1] and Peach fuzzer [3].
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Chapter 3
D-BUS
D-Bus is a protocol and a message bus system providing applications a simple way to talk
to one another. D-Bus is “a system for inter-process communication (IPC) and makes it
simple and reliable to code a ‘single instance’ application or daemon, and to launch appli-
cations and daemons on demand when their services are needed” [4].
The low-level API for D-Bus is written in C but most of the documentation and code
is written for a higher level binding (Python or GLib). D-Bus has both the system bus
daemon (for events such as “new hardware device added” or “printer queue changed”)
and the session bus daemon (for general inter-process communication needs among user
applications). The message bus is built on top of a general one-to-one message passing
framework, which can be used by any two applications to communicate directly (without
going through the message bus daemon). The communicating applications are either on one
computer, or they communicate through unencrypted TCP/IP socket suitable for use be-
hind a firewall [4].
The source of information in this chapter was “D-Bus specification” [10], “D-Bus tuto-
rial” [11] and “Red Hat Magazine” [9].
3.1 Protocols
Computers use protocols in all aspects of internal and external communication. Proto-
cols represent a structure for data transfer and processing with defined syntax. Certain
standards and rules understood by both sending and receiving entities must be agreed
on to communicate data in meaningful way [6].
Some protocols are designed to be human readable and are represented in plain text
form. Other protocols are represented in binary format.
Plain text protocols
These protocols are human readable, they use mostly the printable ASCII scheme. This
includes numbers, lowercase and capital letters, symbols, carriage returns (’\r’), new
lines (’\n’), tabs (’\t’) and spaces. Plain text protocols are less efficient than binary
protocols as they are more memory consuming, but they are easy to debug and analyse [6].
Many plain text protocols are transported in serialised XML or JSON formats.
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Binary protocols
Binary protocols consist of a stream of raw bytes. Without an understanding of the pro-
tocol, the packets will not be meaningful [6]. They are intended or expected to be read
by a machine rather than a human being, as opposed to a plain text. Binary protocols have
advantage of terseness, which apply to a speed of transmission and interpretation. Binary
protocols include TCP, UDP, RTP or SSH.
3.2 D-Bus architecture
D-Bus has several layers:
• A library, libdbus, that allows two applications to connect to each other and exchange
messages.
• A message bus daemon executable, built on libdbus, that multiple applications can
connect to. The daemon can route messages from one application to zero or more
other applications.
• Wrapper libraries or bindings based on particular application frameworks.
Figure 3.1: D-Bus overview [4]
D-Bus contains the bus daemons which act as routers for messages. Processes can con-
nect to the bus daemons to use their routing services as stated on D-Bus overview 3.1.
There are two standard buses: the system bus and the session bus.
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The system bus is a global daemon that any application running in any context can use
as a transport router. It is a single point where applications can export services that any-
one can use. Only one system bus daemon can be run at a time within an operating system.
The session bus is the bus local to the current user’s session. It is used for communica-
tion between applications running within the same X Window System1 session. For every
login to X, a session bus daemon is started.
D-BUS protocol is binary, which means D-BUS messages incur low overhead when mar-
shaling and demarshaling data. Messages consist of two sections, the header and the body.
The header contains routing information and the type signature for the data. The body con-
tains the data being sent in binary format. Each piece of data has a type code associated
with it and is packed into the body accordingly. Some common types include bytes, 32
and 64 bit integers, doubles, unix file descriptors and strings. Common data types can be
used to build more complex data types such as arrays, dictionaries or structures.
3.2.1 Objects and object paths
Messages are sent to objects. A D-Bus objects are conceptually similar to those found in ob-
ject oriented programming languages with the exception that they are pointed to by object
paths (not by memory addresses). Object paths are in forms of strings similar to Unix
file system paths. D-Bus exports the /org/freedesktop/DBus object. Applications can
register as many objects as they wish.
3.2.2 Methods and signals
Each object has members – methods and signals. Methods are operations that can be
invoked on an object, with optional input (arguments) and output (return values). Signals
are broadcasts from the object to any application on the same bus, which registered that it
is interested in signals emitted by this object. Signals may contain a data payload. Methods
and signals are referred to by name.
3.2.3 Interfaces
Each object supports one or more interfaces. An interface is a named group of methods
and signals (as in GLib or Qt). Interfaces allow the same method name to be used more than
once, so the interface is specifying which of those methods is actually invoked. Interfaces
define the type of an object instance. D-Bus identifies interfaces with a simple namespaced
string. Most bindings to other programming languages have mapping of those interface
names directly to the appropriate programming language constructs (C++ virtual classes
for example). D-Bus imports the org.freedesktop.DBus interface.
3.2.4 Proxies
A proxy object represents a remote object in another process. In the low-level D-Bus C API
it is necessary to manually create a method call message, send it, then manually receive
and process the method reply message. In higher-level bindings proxies are used to do that
instead. So when a method is invoked on a proxy object, the high-level binding converts it
1X Window is a system and a network protocol that provides a basis for graphical user interfaces
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into a D-Bus low-level method call message, waits for the reply message, unpacks the return
value, and returns it from the native D-Bus method.
3.2.5 Bus names
When each application connects to the bus daemon, the daemon immediately assigns it
a name, called the unique connection name. This unique name begins with a colon char-
acter. Bus daemon ensures that these unique names are never reused during the lifetime
of the bus daemon, so given unique name will always refer to the same application. An ex-
ample of a unique name might be :1.396. The numbers after the colon have no meaning
besides that they must be unique within the bus daemon. Application starts to own a name
on the bus daemon as soon as the name is mapped to a particular application connection.
Applications may also own additional well-known names (also called services). A D-Bus
application may register one or more well-known names (services) that it will then own until
it releases them. Example could be the name called org.freedesktop.dfuzzer.
If application wants to own this well-known name (service), it should have an object
at the path /org/freedesktop/dfuzzerObject. This object must be supporting the inter-
face org.freedesktop.dfuzzerInterface. Other applications connected to the same bus
daemon could then send messages to this bus name (service), object and interface to exe-
cute method calls.
In general, the unique names can be thought of as IP addresses and the well-known
names as domain names. So org.freedesktop.dfuzzer might map to something like
:1.396 just as google.com maps to IP address 173.194.35.70.
Using well-known names (services) brings one big advantage. When an application
crashes or exits, the operating system kernel has a responsibility to close its connection
to the message bus. As soon as the message bus daemon registers that an application
disconnected, it sends out notification messages to all remaining applications that the dis-
connected application names have lost their owner. This can be used by other applications
to monitor the lifetime of an application in which they are interested or an application they
communicate with.
3.2.6 Addresses
Applications which use D-Bus are either servers or clients. A typical server would be the bus
daemon which listens for incoming connections. Client on the other hand initiates a con-
nection to the server (typically the bus daemon) and when the connection is established,
communication is a symmetric flow of messages. Using client-server architecture only mat-
ters when setting up connections.
A D-Bus address specifies where a server will listen to connections, and where a client
will connect. An example could be the address unix:path=/tmp/abcdef which specifies
that the server will listen on a UNIX domain socket at the path /tmp/abcdef and the client
will connect to that socket. An address of a server can also specify TCP/IP sockets or any
other transport mechanism.
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The address of the session bus daemon can be determined by reading an environment
variable – in D-Bus protocol, this is done by libdbus automatically. libdbus also discovers
the system bus daemon by checking a well-known UNIX domain socket path (an environ-
ment variable can be also used for the system bus daemon discovery).
In an unusual case when not using a bus daemon, there is a need to define client-server
architecture – who will be the server and who will be the client. Also a mechanism for them
to agree on the server address must be specified.
3.2.7 Calling a method
To make a particular method call on a particular object instance, a number of nested com-
ponents have to be named:
Address -> [Bus Name] -> Path -> Interface -> Method
The bus name is optional (in brackets), as you only use it to route the method call
to the right application when using the bus daemon. Otherwise a direct connection is used,
so bus names are not used as there is no bus daemon.
The interface is used primarily for historical reasons, but it should be used anyway. If
the interface is omitted, a method name is ambiguous and it is undefined which method
will be invoked. When calling a method, two messages are routed through the bus daemon:
• a method call message sent from process A to process B
• a matching method reply message sent from process B to process A
The caller includes a different serial number in each call message, and the callee includes
this number to allow the caller to match replies to calls.
D-Bus methods may accept any number of arguments and may return any number
of values, including none. When method calls specify no return value, a “method return”
message is still sent to the calling application. This allows applications using the remote
API to know that the remote method invocation has completed even if no useful result is
returned.
The only way to suppress the generation of the reply message in an acknowledgement
to a D-Bus method call is if the “no reply expected” flag is sent as part of the method
invocation. It is an optional D-Bus implementation feature.
3.2.8 Emitting a signal
A signal in D-Bus consists of a single message, sent by one process to any number of other
processes and is entirely asynchronous. Signals may be emitted by D-Bus objects at any
time. A signal is an unidirectional broadcast and it may contain only arguments (a data
payload), as it is a broadcast, so it never has a return value.
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The emitter (sender) of signals sends them to the bus daemon. Recipients of the sig-
nals register within the bus daemon to receive signals based on match rules – these rules
typically include the sender and the signal name. The bus daemon then sends signals only
to those recipients who have registered them.
3.3 GDBus – GLib D-Bus binding
Bindings are used to wrap low-level D-Bus C API calls to the higher level libraries or
language constructs. Whenever the low-level D-Bus API is changed, only internals of bind-
ings must be modified. This protects all of the applications using these bindings against
need to adapt their code whenever D-Bus protocol is changed. That was the main reason
why GDBus binding was used for implementation of the tool for fuzz testing applications
using D-Bus system. Binding to GLib was chosen because many applications use it al-
ready and it is also the main higher level binding for GNOME applications communicating
through D-Bus system.
The source of information in this section was “GNOME Developer Center” and its doc-
umentations [13, 12].
3.3.1 Connection to a message bus
The GDBusConnection type is used for D-Bus connections to remote peers such as a mes-
sage buses. It is a low-level API which provides methods for connection to the specified
message bus and also setting up connection properties. When a connection is established,
the GDBusConnection type holds information about it.
3.3.2 Proxy for accessing D-Bus interfaces
For creating a proxy, the GDBusConnection type, a bus name (well-known or unique), an ob-
ject path and a D-Bus interface name are required. If a proxy is created for a well-known
name and no name owner currently exists, the message bus will be requested to launch
a name owner for the name. This means that if an application requesting some well-known
name (service) creates a proxy for that well-known name (and no name owner currently
exists), a name owner will be launched by message bus. On successful proxy creation, it will
be stored in GDBusProxy base class, which could be then used to access a D-Bus interface
on a remote object for calling methods or emitting signals.
3.3.3 Object introspection
Object introspection can be used to obtain information about object interfaces, interface
methods and individual method parameteres. The introspection file can be obtained by call-
ing the org.freedesktop.DBus.Introspectable.Introspect method on an initialized
proxy base class. This method name contains dots to let D-Bus know that a name is
split into interface and method name parts. This allows using proxy for invoking meth-
ods on other interfaces. Call of the org.freedesktop.DBus.Introspectable.Introspect
method returns introspection of object in serialized form in a GVariant type. GVariant
value is then deserialized into classical string, which is parsed and output of parsing is used
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to fill a GDBusNodeInfo structure. This structure can be then used to find desired interfaces,
methods and arguments either by specialized GDBus functions or by working with pointers
through a GDBusNodeInfo structure. Example of introspection of the /org/gnome/Shell
object by calling tool for working with D-Bus objects, gdbus (some omitted iterfaces are
highlighted by dots):
$ gdbus introspect --session -d org.gnome.Shell -o /org/gnome/Shell --xml
<!DOCTYPE node PUBLIC "-//freedesktop//DTD D-BUS Object Introspection 1.0//EN"
"http://www.freedesktop.org/standards/dbus/1.0/introspect.dtd">
<!-- GDBus 2.34.2 -->
<node>
.
.
.
<interface name="org.freedesktop.DBus.Introspectable">
<method name="Introspect">
<arg type="s" name="xml_data" direction="out"/>
</method>
</interface>
.
.
.
<interface name="org.gnome.Shell">
<method name="Eval">
<arg type="s" name="script" direction="in">
</arg>
<arg type="b" name="success" direction="out">
</arg>
<arg type="s" name="result" direction="out">
</arg>
</method>
<method name="ScreenshotArea">
<arg type="i" name="x" direction="in">
</arg>
<arg type="i" name="y" direction="in">
</arg>
<arg type="i" name="width" direction="in">
</arg>
<arg type="i" name="height" direction="in">
</arg>
<arg type="b" name="flash" direction="in">
</arg>
<arg type="s" name="filename" direction="in">
</arg>
<arg type="b" name="success" direction="out">
</arg>
</method>
<method name="ScreenshotWindow">
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<arg type="b" name="include_frame" direction="in">
</arg>
<arg type="b" name="include_cursor" direction="in">
</arg>
<arg type="b" name="flash" direction="in">
</arg>
<arg type="s" name="filename" direction="in">
</arg>
<arg type="b" name="success" direction="out">
</arg>
</method>
<method name="Screenshot">
<arg type="b" name="include_cursor" direction="in">
</arg>
<arg type="b" name="flash" direction="in">
</arg>
<arg type="s" name="filename" direction="in">
</arg>
<arg type="b" name="success" direction="out">
</arg>
</method>
<method name="FlashArea">
<arg type="i" name="x" direction="in">
</arg>
<arg type="i" name="y" direction="in">
</arg>
<arg type="i" name="width" direction="in">
</arg>
<arg type="i" name="height" direction="in">
</arg>
</method>
<property type="b" name="OverviewActive" access="readwrite">
</property>
<property type="s" name="ShellVersion" access="read">
</property>
</interface>
.
.
.
</node>
As seen from object introspection, the /org/gnome/Shell object has more interfaces (ob-
ject must have at least one interface). Interfaces has methods and signals. Each argument
of a method is declared with name, its direction and signature string (signature encodings
are in table 3.1).
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3.3.4 Method calls
To call a method, its name must be specified including arguments serialized in a GVariant
type. Each argument of a method has its signature encoding as stated in table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Signature encoding
Character Data type
y 8-bit unsigned integer
b boolean value
n 16-bit signed integer
q 16-bit unsigned integer
i 32-bit signed integer
u 32-bit unsigned integer
x 64-bit signed integer
t 64-bit unsigned integer
d double-precision floating point number
s UTF-8 string (no embedded null characters)
o D-Bus Object Path string
g D-Bus Signature string
a Array
( Structure start
) Structure end
v Variant type (GVariant type)
{ Dictionary begin
} Dictionary end
h Unix file descriptor
The signatures of arguments are then joined to form the signature string, which serves
as format string (similar to the format strings in printf() function) to create a GVariant
type containing all argument values. For example, a method accepting a string and
a signed 32-bit integer and returning no values would use “(si)” for the argument sig-
nature and empty string for the return value.
3.3.5 Using GError
GLib provides a standard method of reporting errors from a called function to the calling
code. Reporting errors is solved by exceptions in many other languages. Almost every
function takes a return location of GError object as its last parameter. Caller of the function
can then (after a function return) test a GError value if it is not NULL, report error message
to a user and recover from the error or end a program.
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Chapter 4
Designing dfuzzer, a tool for fuzz
testing processes using D-Bus
system
There are many ways of fuzz testing D-Bus system. In general there are two main possi-
bilities:
• fuzz testing of the D-Bus daemons and the D-Bus protocol
• fuzz testing of D-Bus daemons clients
Fuzz testing of the D-Bus daemons and the D-Bus protocol
When fuzz testing the D-Bus daemons and its protocol there is need to use the native C
D-Bus API. Bindings cannot be used, because they have strict checks of data being sent
through their proxy objects. The principle of this fuzz testing would be communication
of two applications through a D-Bus daemon. They would send malformed D-Bus protocol
packets (messages) to each other, by mangling portions of data within these packets. Fuzzer
would have to simulate a communication between bus daemon clients and it would also have
to be watching the bus daemon status – its memory usage and its state.
Fuzz testing of D-Bus daemon clients
This work was considering three options of fuzz testing D-Bus clients:
• Connect to the session bus daemon and test processes connected to it by sending
them messages and monitoring results
• Connect to the system bus daemon and test processes connected to it by sending
them messages and monitoring results
• Simulate the session bus daemon, let processes connect and test them
The first two options – using the session/system bus daemon for routing messages
between processes has many advantages. The biggest one is that all processes connected
to a bus and using well-known names can be fuzz tested. This is enabled by an object intro-
spection. The object introspection tells what interfaces does the object contain, including
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interface methods and their arguments. Other advantages may be routing of messages
by a bus daemon or using bindings instead of the native D-Bus C API, which is related
to produce less code. Disadvantage of using the session/system bus daemon with bindings
are strict data checks, which do not allow to route undesirable messages as for example in-
valid UTF-8 strings or object paths. Although it may seem to be a limitation for a fuzzer,
other processes using bindings have this limitation too, so it would not be appropriate
to test messages the processes can never send or receive through a bus daemon.
The third option – simulating session bus daemon would require using the native C
D-Bus API with libdbus library. This includes to code a bus daemon simulator which
can handle D-Bus connections and use message dispatcher with destination table to cor-
rectly route messages through D-Bus connections between processes. Fuzz testing would
then include connection of tested processes to the bus daemon simulator and letting them
communicate with each other. The bus daemon simulator would be modificating this com-
munication messages and watching processes reactions to these modificated messages.
The first option was chosen for the fuzzer as there are more applications on the session
bus than on the system bus daemon and there is no need to implement the tool in the na-
tive D-Bus C API. The system bus daemon also uses the same mechanism for connection
of applications as the session bus, and so extending the fuzzer to work also for the system
bus daemon should be straightforward.
4.1 dfuzzer architecture
dfuzzer is a tool implemented within this work for testing D-Bus applications. Targeted
applications for dfuzzer are session bus daemon clients. It is a command-line tool which
takes options as arguments for setting up fuzz testing of a chosen application. dfuzzer
is a generation-based fuzzer (2.2) and it randomly generates data for method arguments
according to signatures of arguments (3.1). It is a local fuzzer (2.4) although it does
not interact with tested applications processes directly, but through a system daemon –
the session bus.
Division into modules
dfuzzer is using a modular architecture, and so individual problems are divided into individ-
ual modules. These modules include random module, introspection module and fuzz module.
The random module is responsible for pseudo-random data generation. It can generate
data for every primitive method argument signature (3.1), except complex data types as
structures, arrays of types and dictionaries which were not implemented. It also saves gen-
erated data sizes to be able to give a condition to end fuzz testing of a method.
The introspection module performs an object introspection. It requests introspection
file of a chosen object from the session bus daemon. Returned XML file with object in-
terfaces, methods and their arguments is then parsed into GDBus structures and desired
interface is found. The introspection module also includes iterators for these GDBus struc-
tures to iterate through interface methods and their arguments.
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The fuzz module is given a name of a method and its arguments signatures. Sub-
sequently, individiual arguments are created from the signatures by the random module
for data generation. After arguments were created, a method is called. When a method
call returns NULL, it means that a tested application does not respond or it disconnected
from the bus daemon. The fuzz module is also parsing a /proc/pid/status1 file to monitor
a tested application process status to be able to confirm that a tested application really
disconnected from the bus daemon. Process status file is also used for monitoring an ap-
plication process memory usage.
4.2 dfuzzer implementation
The tool for fuzzing session bus clients was implemented in the C programming language
using GDBus binding to the native D-Bus C API. The fuzzer was implemented and tested
in the GNU/Linux operating system.
When a user logs in to X Window System, the session bus daemon is started. Appli-
cation processes can then connect to the session bus daemon to use it for an inter-process
communication. When a process is connected to the session bus, it can either provide a se-
vice (specified by well-known name) or only use the session bus daemon for communication
with other processes. Usually a process with a well-known name acts as a server and a pro-
cess with a unique name is initiating a connection and so acts as a client.
dfuzzer is fuzz testing only processes with well-known names on the session bus dae-
mon. This means it needs to own only a unique name within the session bus. dfuzzer is
a command-line tool which takes the following required options as its arguments:
• a process bus name
• a process object path
• a process interface
These options are required as dfuzzer must know which interface of which object and which
bus name it should communicate with through the session bus daemon. Other options which
are not required include:
• a name of a file for logging (default created log file is log.log)
• memory limit for a tested process – if this limit is exceeded, dfuzzer logs a warning
message into a log file (default memory limit was chosen as three times process initial
memory size)
• maximum buffer size for generated strings (default maximum size is 50000 bytes)
• flag to launch process after crash – if tested process crashes during fuzzing and this
option is set, crashed process will be launched again and testing will continue
1pid is process identification number
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When dfuzzer is launched it creates a connection to the session bus daemon by call-
ing the method g bus get sync() which returns a GDBusConnection object containing all
information about the connection including unique name assigned to dfuzzer from the ses-
sion bus daemon. Then a specified process bus name, an object path and an interface
are used in call of the function g dbus proxy new sync() to create a GDBusProxy object
which will be used for communication with a tested process. Communication of dfuzzer
with a tested process is shown on the figure 4.1. After connecting to the session bus daemon,
dfuzzer requests a tested process identifier for a specified process bus name by calling
the method org.freedesktop.DBus.GetConnectionUnixProcessID. A process identifier
is used for monitoring a tested process status.
Figure 4.1: dfuzzer communication with GNOME Shell [14] through the bus daemon
Destination Table
"/usr/bin/gnome-shell"
name: "org.gnome.Shell"
object path: "/org/gnome/Shell
interface: "org.gnome.Shell
DBusConnection1:
DBusConnection2:
"/.../dfuzzer"
name: ":1.126"
Message Dispatcher
if (message == signal)
    broadcast;
else
    find destination (in Destination Table)
    named by message and route that
    message to the proper DBusConnection
BUS DAEMON
Application code
Application process: "/usr/bin/gnome-shell"
GDBus GLib binding
name: "org.gnome.Shell"
object path: "/org/gnome/Shell"
interface: "org.gnome.Shell"
GDBusProxy
GDBusConnection
DBusConnection
Application code
Application process: "/.../dfuzzer"
GDBus GLib binding
name: ":1.126"
GDBusProxyGDBusConnection
DBusConnection
DBusConnection1 DBusConnection2
bidirectional message stream
bidirectional message stream
Before fuzz testing of a specified process, object introspection must be done first. The in-
terface org.freedesktop.DBus.Introspectable contains the Introspect method which
can be called using a GDBusProxy object to get an XML file containing all of the interfaces
and the methods of a process specified by a GDBusProxy object. Returned XML file is
in string format and so it is parsed into a GDBusNodeInfo structure which can be used
to find a particular interface. Interfaces are stored in a list of GDBusInterfaceInfo struc-
tures which contain lists of methods (GDBusMethodInfo structure) and to each method
there is a list of its arguments (GDBusArgInfo structure). The introspection module which
is part of dfuzzer encapsulates all object introspection details and provides an interface
for easy iteration through methods and their arguments.
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Every method argument signature is specified by its direction which is either “out”
(returned argument signature) or “in” (accepted argument signature). When an object
introspection of a specified interface is done, dfuzzer iterates through interface methods.
For every method, its accepted arguments signatures (with direction “in”) and a method
name are passed to the fuzz module. Fuzz testing of a method passed to the fuzz mod-
ule takes place in the cycle by calling this method many times, but with different argu-
ments. Before each call of a method, its arguments must be generated first. Arguments are
generated by calling functions from the random module according to argument signature.
Generated arguments are stored in GVariant types. A GVariant is used instead of the C
union type as any data described by a signature (3.1) can be stored inside it. A GVariant
is created by calling the function g variant new() which can be think of as an analogue
to the sprintf() function. The g variant new() function takes a format string containing
signatures (3.1) as its first argument and remaining arguments of the function are sources
of data according to a format string.
Before calling a method, a GVariant type containing structure with all arguments
must be created. A function call to create this GVariant must be constructed dynam-
ically, during runtime of dfuzzer as every method has different number and type of ar-
guments. The libffi library is used for this dynamic function call construction. After
a GVariant containing structure with all arguments is created, a method can be called
through a GDBusProxy object using the g dbus proxy call sync() function. A method is
called synchronously because when error occurs, it returns a NULL and so dfuzzer knows that
well-known name is no longer on the bus daemon or no response returned after timeout (even
if a method has no return value, a “method return” message is still sent to the caller).
When the g dbus proxy call sync() function returns NULL on a method call, dfuzzer
looks into a tested process status file /proc/pid/status to be sure that a tested process
really crashed. If not, it means that a tested process spent a long time processing the data
received from dfuzzer and so it did not responded to the method call from dfuzzer in given
timeout. When dfuzzer finds out that a tested process did not crash, testing is continuing.
In the case a tested process crashed or exceeded a specified memory limit, a log is added
to a log file describing a specified event. A log file entry is a name of a method with its
arguments. If some event occured during testing a method, a log is created within a method
entry. Log headers are written in brackets with a method name as prefix and have a serial
number ([method name LOG 1], [method name LOG 2], etc.). After a log header there
is a message describing an event which occurred followed by a process memory size. The last
items in log are the inputs on which an event occured and so the arguments signatures
with the corresponding values. An example of the truncated log file from fuzz testing
the GNOME Shell 3.6.3.1 [14]:
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===========================================================================
fuzzing method Eval(s):
end of fuzzing of method ’Eval’
===========================================================================
===========================================================================
fuzzing method ScreenshotArea(i, i, i, i, b, s):
[ScreenshotArea LOG 1]
process disconnected from D-Bus
last known process memory size: [289028 kB]
on input:
--i-- ’2147483647’
--i-- ’2147483647’
--i-- ’2147483647’
--i-- ’-2147483648’
--b-- ’true’
--s [length: 67 B]-- ’}>;VhlC) H-C}zF>\!550d-%49!Nax;_4S3|@W$>|1aw)%4e#
Iz4/%9@;7l|0%]BXm?’
end of fuzzing of method ’ScreenshotArea’
===========================================================================
===========================================================================
fuzzing method ScreenshotWindow(b, b, b, s):
end of fuzzing of method ’ScreenshotWindow’
===========================================================================
...
The random module provides functions for generation of all basic data types (stated
in table 3.1) except arrays, structures and dictionaries which were not implemented. When
generating numbers, the rand() and random() functions are used. Besides pseudo-random
numbers, the random module also generates a specific boundary values of number types (also
negative for signed number types). As dfuzzer uses GDBus binding, the functions in the ran-
dom module generate only valid UTF-8 strings. Pseudo-random characters which are used
to fill strings are counted to fit the printable range:
rand() % (127 - 32) + 32
The random module also provides the NULL terminated array of strings, which will be sent
to a tested process if it has any string parameters. Tester can include any valid UTF-8
strings inside this array including shell commands, bus names, object paths, interfaces or
format strings.
To test dfuzzer functionality during an implementation, a test server was implemented
which exports a well-known name on the session bus daemon with one own interface and one
method. Source codes of dfuzzer including the test server which was used for its testing
can be found on https://github.com/matusmarhefka/dfuzzer.
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Chapter 5
Fuzz testing results
dfuzzer was used to fuzz test three chosen applications which use D-Bus system for inter-
process communication:
• GNOME Shell [14] – the core user interface of the GNOME desktop environment
providing basic functionality like switching between windows and launching applica-
tions
• IMSettings [18] – a framework that delivers Input Method settings and applies
the changes immediately, so it will takes an effect without restarting applications
and the desktop
• Evince [15] – a document viewer for multiple document formats
Each application was fuzz tested twice. The results of testing can be found in log files
on the CD.
5.1 Fuzz testing Evince
dfuzzer was fuzz testing methods of:
bus name: org.gnome.evince.Daemon
object path: /org/gnome/evince/Daemon
interface: org.gnome.evince.Daemon
The first and the second fuzz tests results of the tool did not find any non-standard be-
haviour of the Evince document viewer.
5.2 Fuzz testing GNOME Shell
Fuzz tests results of the GNOME Shell are presented in the tables 5.1 and 5.2. dfuzzer was
fuzz testing methods of:
bus name: org.gnome.Shell
object path: /org/gnome/Shell
interface: org.gnome.Shell
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The first fuzz tests of the GNOME Shell took approximately 4 minutes and 40 seconds
to complete. The second fuzz tests were not finished completely because the GNOME Shell
could not even reload from the crash.
Table 5.1: Results of first fuzz tests of the GNOME Shell
Method name Event Memory size [kB]
Eval(s) – standard
ScreenshotArea(i, i, i, i, b, s) process disconnected from D-Bus 146160
ScreenshotWindow(b, b, b, s) – standard
Screenshot(b, b, s) – standard
FlashArea(i, i, i, i) – standard
The first fuzz tests results (in table 5.1) show that a method ScreenshotArea caused
a crash of the GNOME Shell. The input arguments were:
ScreenshotArea(i, i, i, i, b, s):
--i-- ’2147483647’
--i-- ’2147483647’
--i-- ’2147483647’
--i-- ’-2147483648’
--b-- ’false’
--s [length: 114 B]-- ’\fR3~,jc5?\_FzmxB%NaO?HmnW)3e+LBq~Rn,=R>]/z
!(iyJnE);dQ*P’0cl;0,*-_x6|HQWULX]6O%"t/;V‘E(dRkQmy^w’;n:87kmi8CDLsJNeVi’
Other methods did not cause any non-standard behaviour.
Table 5.2: Results of second fuzz tests of the GNOME Shell
Method name Log message Memory size [kB]
Eval(s) – standard
ScreenshotArea(i, i, i, i, b, s) process disconnected from D-Bus 287300
ScreenshotWindow(b, b, b, s) process disconnected from D-Bus 58040
The second fuzz tests (in table 5.2) crashed the GNOME Shell again with the following
input arguments of the method ScreenshotArea:
ScreenshotArea(i, i, i, i, b, s):
--i-- ’-2147483648’
--i-- ’2147483647’
--i-- ’2147483647’
--i-- ’2147483647’
--b-- ’true’
--s [length: 164 B]-- ’PQbnvwe2FJY4UQ_E2Ei!O g"\0i"TTk%’Kp}CV-j}c~
S2\vD"‘EO]-N::8:nm&ptQaoq5|Y4‘Vdo0[4/9V[v‘+2zCLi1OZ#}9roNlG_JzE:+!N:
;%v/b">]BgDQ7{T55E#d2GD]BfwMhDd!F[0*ZOd}7*LO&!a<Ca}V)’
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Compared to the first fuzz tests, one more serious crash of the GNOME Shell on a call
of the method ScreenshotWindow was found. The crash happened immediately after
the GNOME Shell restart which was caused by the previous call of the ScreenshotArea
method. The method ScreenshotWindow was called with these input arguments:
ScreenshotWindow(b, b, b, s):
--b-- ’false’
--b-- ’true’
--b-- ’false’
--s [length: 77 B]-- ’G1C!HhBR}Id{mEU~C(8\tR)=’~.|6%‘Z6"[^j}.eGr_5
851X;I60x<N}8YzN^Y)t[aPC_^*’Of:d{’
and caused a crash of the GNOME Shell from which it could not reload and only offered
a logout option.
5.3 Fuzz testing IMSettings
Fuzz tests results of the IMSettings are presented in the tables 5.3 and 5.4. dfuzzer was
fuzz testing methods of:
bus name: com.redhat.imsettings
object path: /com/redhat/imsettings
interface: com.redhat.imsettings
Table 5.3: Results of first fuzz tests of the IMSettings
Method name Log message Initial Current
mem. [kB] mem. [kB]
GetInfoVariants(s) memory size exceeded set limit 4000 36044
GetInfoVariant(s, s) process disconnected from D-Bus 4000 83604
GetUserIM(s) memory size exceeded set limit 3604 32580
GetSystemIM(s) memory size exceeded set limit 3604 97408
IsSystemDefault(s, s) memory size exceeded set limit 3604 144064
IsUserDefault(s, s) memory size exceeded set limit 3604 178972
IsXIM(s, s) process disconnected from D-Bus 3604 214936
SwitchIM(s, s, b) process disconnected from D-Bus 4000 4060
LoadModule(s) – standard standard
UnloadModule(s) – standard standard
The first fuzz tests results indicate that the IMSettings daemon is leaking memory as
can be seen from the table 5.3. dfuzzer also registered three crashes of the IMSettings
daemon. After few calls of the method GetInfoVariants the IMSettings daemon memory
size reached the 36044 kB (the initial memory size was 4000 kB). The first crash occured
on a call of the method GetInfoVariant with the size of memory 83604 kB. The fuzz tests
of the next methods to the IsUserDefault method confirm memory leaks in the IMSet-
tings daemon (memory size raised from the 3604 kB to the 178972 kB). The last two crashes
of the IMSettings daemon are caused by the IsXIM and the SwitchIM methods. The inputs
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which are responsible for the memory leaks and the crashes of the IMSettings daemon were
long strings, usually with size of several hundreds of bytes. These inputs can be found in
log files on CD.
The second fuzz tests (stated in table 5.4) confirmed the results of the first tests. Each
of the two fuzz tests took approximately 8 minutes to complete.
Table 5.4: Results of second fuzz tests of the IMSettings
Method name Log message Initial Current
mem. [kB] mem. [kB]
GetInfoVariants(s) memory size exceeded set limit 3652 32924
GetInfoVariant(s, s) process disconnected from D-Bus 3652 82832
GetUserIM(s) memory size exceeded set limit 3600 32500
GetSystemIM(s) memory size exceeded set limit 3600 97388
IsSystemDefault(s, s) memory size exceeded set limit 3600 145408
IsUserDefault(s, s) memory size exceeded set limit 3600 177340
IsXIM(s, s) process disconnected from D-Bus 3600 212400
SwitchIM(s, s, b) process disconnected from D-Bus 3645 3852
LoadModule(s) – standard standard
UnloadModule(s) – standard standard
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
The goal of this work was to use the fuzzing for testing applications using D-Bus com-
munication system and an automation of this task. The work describes existing fuzzers
for individual testing targets and also D-Bus communication system including its archi-
tecture. Subsequently, the tool architecture and implementation are discussed followed
by the tests results produced by the implemented tool.
The implemented tool (dfuzzer) was used to test three chosen applications – GNOME
Shell, IMSettings and Evince. An object introspection was used to allow dfuzzer to “study”
application object interfaces, so the tool can be used to test all the applications connected
to the session bus daemon besides ones chosen for the testing in this work. The only limita-
tion in this fuzz testing automation is that some functions containing more complex argu-
ments (like structures, arrays of types and dictionaries) are impossible to test with dfuzzer,
because the author did not manage to find the appropriate automated method for gener-
ation of such complex types during the tool implementation. The current implementation
of dfuzzer skips the functions containing complex types (example of a complex type may be
an array of structures containing an array of strings (“a(as)”)). The absence of complex
types generation should be eliminated in a further development of the project.
The testing of chosen applications revealed bugs which were reported to the develop-
ers of the applications. The most bugs have been found in the IMSettings daemon which
suffered from the crashes and memory leaks. These bugs were reported on the IMSettings
Issues page1, but they have not been confirmed yet. The GNOME Shell tests also revealed
bugs. One test case caused the GNOME Shell to crash, but it reloaded and testing contin-
ued. The second test case on the other hand crashed the GNOME Shell immediately after
the first test case and caused that it was unable to reload, only logout option was offered.
The approach of the GNOME developers to the reported bugs2 was lax. One of them
commented that the values given to the tested methods are not valid, so it is almost le-
git the GNOME Shell crashes in this case and that the tested methods are in a private
interface used only by certain GNOME applications. These facts may be true, but still let-
ting the application to crash is not a good programming practice as one of the developers
also admitted. The decision wheter the GNOME developers correct these bugs and make
the GNOME Shell more robust is anyway on them. This work is not going to discuss or
1https://bitbucket.org/tagoh/imsettings/issue/1/imsettings-d-bus-interface
2https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=699752
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disprove the GNOME developers opinions, its goal was just to pinpoint such cases that
force applications to behave incorrectly.
The implemented fuzzer is not bound to any specific application. It targets all the appli-
cations connected to the session bus daemon, and so its effectiveness might not be the same
as for a fuzzer targeting a specific application. For the future, it would be good to add
a generation of complex argument types, extend dfuzzer to work also for the system bus
daemon applications testing and also include dfuzzer into some application test suites.
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